RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT

by Leigh Elliott

    Several arguments on the problem of free will versus determinism have been presented for us to consider. The various views revolve around different definitions of "free" and go on to reach different conclusions. Moritz Schlick says that if the definition had been clearly established, "the psuedo-argument which lies at the root of the psuedo-problem, and which recurs thousands of times, within and outside of philosophical books, would never have arisen" (145).
    According to determinism, all human behavior has a cause and is predictable. Therefore, we have no free will. Denying this, by claiming that not all actions have a cause and that we do have free will, is indeterminism. This view claims that every human action is performed randomly, allowing room for future possibilities. And somewhere between the two is soft-determinism or compatibilism. It states that all behavior is determined, but some behavior is not coerced or constrained.
    The issue of free will is closely tied to the varying views on responsibility and punishment. Consider the question, "When is a person responsible for their actions, and when is punishment justified?" The hard-determinist would answer that since all of our behavior is determined by heredity and environment, we are not responsible for our actions, and punishment makes no sense. The soft-determinist would counter by arguing that yes our behavior is determined, but we have free will as far as some behavior is not coerced. Therefore, we are responsible and should be punished for doing wrong. The indeterminist would claim that because we have the freedom to decide at random how to behave, we are responsible, so punishment is justified.
    John Lange makes the following statement: "If criminal behavior depends entirely on the laws governing our own inner selves--and it obviously does--there is no point in punishment in the narrower sense." He believes that genetics determines whether or not a person becomes a criminal. By this, it seems that he supports the hard-determinist argument that our actions are beyond our control, and that punishment is pointless.
    In this essay, I will summarize the views of Blatchford, Stace and Hospers on the free will debate and, and based on their arguments, give their opinions on Lange's statement. Then I will support Stace's view.
    Blatchford's argument in favor of hard-determinism is based on the view that a person's heredity and environment control their will. He presents several examples supporting his position.
    In one of these, a rabbit comes into the line of fire of a man who is at target practice. The sportsman would shoot, while the humanitarian would not shoot. But if both their wills are "free", then something outside their wills determines what their action will be. Blatchford states that heredity and environment make a person either a sportsman or a humanitarian. Heredity makes one man cruel and thoughtless by nature and another man merciful and thoughtful by nature. The difference of environment has caused one man to be taught that killing animals is sport, while the other has been taught that it is wrong. Therefore, "the free will' is really controlled by heredity and environment" (Blatchford 104).
    Blatchford continues that particular actions of people can be known in advance because their heredity and environment have had such a tremendous effect on them. We know that Napolean would attempt to overthrow other nations and Lincoln would loyally and wisely lead his country. Even before an act is committed, heredity and environment have decided the will's action.
    The real problem between determinism and free will, according to Stace, is caused by a semantic dispute. Free will was given an incorrect definition, indeterminism, and, having nothing to answer it, was said not to exist.
    Stace says that common usage is the basis on which the correctness of a definition is determined. He provides some examples to show that the common understanding of "free will" is not indeterminism.
    He compares a man lost in a desert with Mahatma Gandi. Both went without food for a period of time, but Gandhi chose to go without food while the man lost in the desert did not. Gandhi fasted as an act of protest and was not compelled to do so. The man lost in the desert, however, was compelled because the desert was devoid of food to eat.
    Based on this and other examples, Stace comes to the conclusion that the correct definition for free acts is "done without compulsion."
    Stace concludes his essay with his views on responsibility and punishment. A person is not excused from being punished because knowledge of his character convinced us of how he would act. "That determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility is as much a delusion as that it is incompatible with free will" (Stace 114). He justifies punishment with the belief that it will positively affect the wrongdoer's future behavior, or the fear of punishment will prevent others from doing the same. Stace continues that punishment is based on the belief that a person's behavior is causally determined. Without causes for a person's actions, anything done in response to their unacceptable behavior, be it punishment or reward, is futile. Futility results in the realization that nothing can influence their behavior, and consequently moral respon sibility disappears. To be held accountable is to be justly punished or rewarded, if punishment is appropriate, so is responsibility.
    Hospers presents a psychoanalytic view on the free will versus determinism problem. He contends "that it is the unconscious that determines what the conscious impulse and the conscious action will be. . ." (Hospers 127).
    In beginning his argument on responsibility, Hospers gives an illustration: a woman and her seriously ill child are on a train. Her neurosis causes her to act aggressively towards her child, to both anger the husband she hates and to prevent attachment to the child. The child's condition worsens, but the mother will not disembark the train early in order to seek help. When the woman reaches her destination, the child is dead and she blames herself.
    Hospers says the woman was not responsible for the child's death because her neurosis compelled her to act as she did. Though the neurosis is the cause of the actions, the person is not responsible for the neurosis. This is especially true since the neurosis takes root at a very early age.
    He goes on to say that the influence of the unconscious is as great as any external force. The unconscious controls "normal" people as well as neurotics, though it produces more adverse effects in the latter. Hospers reaches the conclusion that "the kind of freedom that people want . . . is precisely the kind that psychiatry says that they cannot have" (134).
    Hospers accepts Stace's definition of "free," but he widen the class of "compelled" to include external and internal forces. He then asks if any freedom in a person's behavior remains.
    Hospers says psychoanalysts would answer that there are degrees of freedom, and a person is less free the more their malevolent unconscious controls their actions. When cured of their neurosis, they become more free, while a "normal" person is the most free.
    If asked if a person is free only as far as the unconscious never plays a role in determining their behavior, psychoanalysts would answer that most of their behavior is not free. Hospers states that far more of our acts are compelled than we believe. He concludes by saying our that "only the comparatively 'vanilla-flavored' aspects of our lives--such as our behavior toward people who don't really matter to us--are exempted from this rule" (Hospers 135). Since he insists that most of our acts are compelled, whether by interior or exterior forces, he would say that we are not free by Stace's definition.
    Based on their views, we can determine the positions of Blatchford, Stace, and Hospers with respect to the quote from Lange: "If criminal behavior depends entirely upon the laws governing our own inner selves--and it obviously does--there is no point in punishment in the narrower sense."
    Blatchford, being a hard-determinist, would support Lange's view. Blatchford repeatedly emphasizes that humans are the product not only of heredity, but also of environment, and these factors control the will. Furthermore, he hopes that his essay "disposes of the claim that man is reponsible be cause his will is free" (Blatchford 107).
    Stace's piece stands in opposition to Lange's quote. He writes that even though, knowing a man's character, we are sure that he will do wrong, we do not excuse him; he is still responsible for his actions. Stace believes we should punish wrongdoers to either affect their future behavior or to deter others.
    Hospers says "the sense of 'free' in which free acts are voluntary ones . . . does not go deep enough. In a deeper sense we cannot hold the person responsible . . ." (133). According to Hospers a person's neurosis is responsible for their actions. In his opinion, criminals who pose a threat to the population should, for the population's safety, be removed from society. This argument of Hospers concurs with that of Lange.
    I agree with the arguments of Stace and the compatibilists because their view can be most practically applied to real life situations.
    Moritz Schlick, P.H. Nowell-Smith, and A.J. Ayer share Stace's definition of freedom and his interpretation of compatibilism. Schlick's argument follows from Stace's view on the causal determination of punishment. He says that a person is responsible if future behavior can be changed by punishment or reward. If their behavior cannot be altered, they are not responsible. Therefore, the insane are not responsible, because neither punishment nor reward will change their behavior. They are unfree in as far as the action through which their mental illness is expressed. The illness hinders their normal functoins, so the illness is responsible instead of the afflicted person. Schlick continues that if a person is subjected to an external constraint, they have been compelled and are not responsible. The one who forced the person to act against their will is responsible.
    Schlick agrees that heredity and environment have an effect on the development of a person's character, but they have no bearing on the answers to questions about responsibility and punishment. In his opinion, "we are trying to discover who is ultimately responsible" (D'Angelo 37). This opposes Blatchford's argument that since a person's heredity and environment control their will, they are not ultimately responsible.
    Nowell-Smith gives a similar argument to Schlick's. He claims that responsibility is based on the effectiveness of punishment and reward. He also supports the view that it is the one who compels a person to commit an act that is responsible. The person who commits the act while coerced, cannot be responsible, since punishment would not prevent future occurences of the act. Nowel-Smith says that sometimes, when a person is considered not to be responsible due to a "compulsion," the compulsion is treated as if it were a physical object. We use the word compulsion "because we want to excuse him in the same sort of way that we excuse someone who is literally punished . . . we know that it will do no good to punish him" (Mowell-Smith 296).
    Ayer supports Stace's preference for common usage. He too believes that it is the standard used to decide whether a definition is correct or incorrect (D'Angelo 25). In his argument he says to have "tried to take a middle position by making freedom consistent with some forms of causality but not with all" (Ayer 4). He shares the views of Stace, Schlick and Nowell-Smith. He agrees with their definition of "free" and their justification of punishment on the basis of reformation and deterrence. Ayer says, "a cleptomaniac is not a free agent, in respect of his stealing, because he does not go through any process of deciding whether or not to steal. Or rather, if he does . . . it is irrele vant to his behavior. Whatever he resolved to do, he would steal all the same. And it is this that distinguishes him from the ordinary thief" (20).
    The problem of free will versus determinism is not just a game of semantics that philosophers play to amuse themselves. Whom we hold responsible,and when we hold them responsible for certain acts,and whether or not we punish them depends on which form of determinism or indeterminism we subscribe to. I believe compatibilism provides the best solutions to these issues. As Schlick says, "no one can prove determinism, but it is certain that we assume its validity in all of our practical life . . . " (158).




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