A PORTRAIT OF ART AS IT SHOULD BE THE AESTHETIC THEORY OF JAMES JOYCE

by DOUGLIS RICHARD BECK

    "Welcome, O life! I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race"Ñso proclaims Stephen Dedalus in James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (253).l   As Stephen embarks on this quest, he does so well equipped with the extensive aesthetic theory of Joyce as professed in A Portrait. Indeed, Joyce's aesthetic theory and its development through Stephen Dedalus is one of the main themes of the book. It should be noted that, while Joyce's theory is presented dramatically through Stephen Dedalus, there exist no significant differences between the beliefs of Stephen and James Joyce himself on the matter (Hope 93). An earlier version of A Portrait entitled Stephen Hero also concentrates largely on the aesthetic theory, as do Joyce's notebooks; but, for the most developed statement of Joyce's theory, A Portrait must be looked at more so than the other works. In examining this aesthetic theory, it is important to realize that it is not a philosophy developed exclusively by Joyce, but one which is strongly influenced, if not independently developed altogether, by a number of other thinkers. Aquinas, Aristotle, Vico, Freud, Flaubert, Berkeley, Pater, Henry James, and Shakespeare are all ". . .thinkers and writers whose ideas or style of expression at one time or another admittedly challenged Joyce's attention and invited his imitation" (Noon 14). Although there are several notable influences on Joyce's aesthetic theory included in the above list, very clearly it is Saint Thomas Aquinas who stands out as the one figure whose philosophy Joyce adheres to most closely in developing his aesthetic theory; even to the point of Stephen Dedalus referring to it in several instances as "applied Aquinas." Examining the indebtedness of Joyce's aesthetic theory to Aquinas, Maurice Beebe asserts that: 

Joyce draws three main principles from two statements by Aquinas; thus, there is some overlapping. An outline of the entire theory may therefore serve as a useful point of reference for discussion of the parts:
       I. Art is a stasis brought about by the formal rhythm of beauty. . . .
       II. Art or beauty, divorced from good and evil, is akin to truth; therefore, if truth can best be approached through intellection, beauty or art is best approached through the three stages of apprehension. . . .
       III. The three qualities of beauty which correspond to the three stages of apprehension are, in the terms of Aquinas, integritas, consonantia, and claritas. . . . (21-22) 

Such a discussion of the Joyce-Aquinas connecdon is important for understanding Joyce's theory itself because of the vast influence of Aquinas which is involved. To that same end, it is equally important to note where Joyce either breaks away from or misinterprets Aquinas in order to arrive at his own conclusions and establish his own theory. On this latter point, Stephen Dedalus offers that, "For my purpose, I can work on at present by the light of one or two ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas. I need them only for my own use and guidance until I have done something for myself by their light" (A Portrait 187). Also important to understanding both Joyce's aesthedc theory and Joyce himself is the effect and applicadon of his theory on the later works of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. This effect, however, is out of the scope of this paper, but there are certain points which I will bring up in order to illustrate the depth and wholeness of Joyce's aesthetic theory.
    "Beauty expressed by the artist cannot awaken in us an emotion which is kinetic or a sensation which is purely physical. It awakens, or ought to awaken, or induces, or ought to induce, an esthetic. . . ." (A Portrait 206). This quote from Stephen in A Portrait serves as definition for his concept of "proper art." Generally, proper art consists in that which does not produce any emotion other than one which in itself satisfies the aesthetic emotion and which places one in a state of aesthetic arrest. Compare this with Joyce's "improper art," which is stated as follows: 

The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing. Desire urges us to possess, to go to something, loathing urges us to abandon, to go from something. These are kinetic emotions. The arts which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are therefore improper arts. (A Portrait 205) 

Thus, proper art is static, while improper art is kinetic. Thomas Connolly offers his summary of Joyce's principles, stating that, " . . .art must produce a stasis in the observer. This is merely an application of Stephen's first principle: the creative artist is concerned with the beautiful, not with the good" (49). With these differences between proper and improper art noted, and with mention of Stephen's "first principle," it now becomes necessary to examine the first of the the statements from Aquinas which Joyce uses as the foundation for his aesthetic theory: pulchra sunt quoe visa placent. This may be translated as "beauty is that which gives pleasure to the sight" (Gifford 235). However, this phrase is somewhat misquoted from Aquinas; Beebe notes the error and offers: "the text of the Summa Theologica has pulchra enim dicunter quae visa placent" (23). Thus the translation would be: "we call a thing beautiful when it pleases the eye of the beholder" (Gifford 235). In looking at the difference between Joyce's interpretation of the text and the work of Aquinas himself, a closer examination of the context in which the statement was placed in the original text of Aquinas suggests that there is a significant divergence from its meaning on Joyce's part. Paul Elmer More asserts that Joyce "would have formulated his [Aquinas'] principles more correctly if, instead of a contrast between kinetic and static, he had distinguished between art that aims to arouse physical lust or loathing, and art that seeks to move desire and joy of hyperphysical realities" (qtd in Noon 37). Another opinion on Joyce's divergence from Aquinas maintains rather that the misquote may be attributable to Joyce's use of a translated text of Aquinas (Beebe 23). The paragraph of Aquinas from which Joyce's statement comes is translated by the Dominican Fathers as:

Beauty and good in a subject are the same, for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently good is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for good properly relates to the appetite (good being what all things desire), and therefore it has the aspect of an end (for the appetite is a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the knowing power, for beautiful things are those which please when seen. Hence, beauty consists in due proportion, for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind--because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every knowing power. (Part I; question 5; article 4)  

What More and Beebe seem to overlook in their criticism is that Joyce himself foreshadows and justifies any breaks from Aquinas' theory in proclaiming that he only needs AquinasÑand AristotleÑas a foundation upon which he can build his own theory: "If the lamp smokes or smells I shall try to trim it. If it does not give enough I shall sell it and buy another" (A Portrait 187). William Noon seems to support this assertion in commenting on More's statement, suggesting that, "It is easy, however, to see what Stephen is leading up to: a theory of art which situates the artistic (and the tragic-as-artistic) as a department of the beautiful" (37). It seems that with that, the issue of Joyce's divergence from Aquinas in this instance can be laid to rest and discussion can move on to the second division of Joyce's aesthetic: that of the beautiful, the good, and the true.
    "Beauty, the splendor of truth, is a gracious presence when the imagination contemplates intensely the truth of its own being or the visible world, and the spirit which proceeds out of truth and beauty is the holy spirit of joy" (CW 83). This statement succeeds in aligning beauty with truth for the reason that they are both static. In keeping with the idea of art and beauty, and thus truth, as static, Joyce must separate his concept of beauty and art from good and evil, in that good and evil excite the kinetic emotions of desire and loathing. In this discussion, Joyce builds on his first quote from AquinasÑ"pulchra sunt quoe visa placent"Ñwhich defines what is beautiful, and quotes Aquinas again in stating "bonum est in quod tendit appetitus," and relying on this as Aquinas's definition of what is good (A Portrait 186). The translation for this phrase works out to: "the good is comprehended in that which is desired" (Gifford 235). Another passage from Aquinas, which appears in Part II of the Summa Theologica, clarifies this matter of the good and distinguishes it somewhat from what is beautiful. Aquinas states: 

The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what we all seek, that which calms the desire is implied in the notion of the good, while that which calms the desire by being seen or known pertains to the notion of the beautiful. Consequently those senses especially have to do with the beautiful which are best avenues of knowledge, namely, sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression beautiful, for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, or of beautiful odours. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a re lation to the knowing power, so that good means that which pleases absolutely the appetite, while the beautiful is something pleasant to apprehend. (Palt II; question 27; article 1) 

From this statement, one can interpret, as Joyce does, Aquinas as meaning that what is good is pleasing to what one desires and/or needs, while the beautiful is pleasant without one having to desire it in the form of appetite. Therefore, what is good is not beautiful because it is kinetic in that it moves one to desire it in order to fulfill an appetite. In a discussion between Stephen Dedalus and the president of his university concerning a paper Stephen is to present on "Drama and Life," Joyce elaborates on his notion of the beautiful, which further establishes it as being separate from the goodÑ 

I [President] notice too that in your essay you allude satirically to what you call the 'antique' theoryÑthe theory, namely, that the drama should have special ethical aims, that it should instruct, elevate, and amuse. I suppose you mean Art for Art's sake.
       ÑI [Stephen] have only pushed to its logical conclusion the definition Aquinas gives of the beautiful.
       ÑAquinas?
       ÑPulcra sunt quae vise placent. He seems to regard the beautiful as that which satisfies the esthetic appetite and nothing moreÑthat the mere apprehension of which pleases. . . . (SH 95) 

Emphasis here should be placed on Stephen's assertion concerning the beautiful "as that which satisfies the esthetic appetite and nothing more. . ."Ñstatic.

Also static is, as mentioned before, truth; for truth does not move one to desire it in order to fulfill an appetite, it merely presents reality as is. With truth and beauty being comparable in that they are both static, Joyce maintains that since "The first step in the direction of truth is to understand the frame and scope of intellection, to comprehend the act itself of intellection," then it must follow that the first step in dealing with beauty "is to understand the frame and scope of the imagination, to comprehend the act of esthetic apprehension" (A Portrait 208). Now, as to what itself is, Joyce's hypothesis states that:

 . . . though the same object may not seem beautiful to all people, all people who admire a beautiful object find in it certain relations which satisfy and coincide with the stages themselves of all esthetic apprehension. These relations of the sensible, visible to you through one form and to me through another, must be the necessary qualities of beauty. (A Portrait 209)

 Later, Stephen again speaks of beauty in this context, stating the "qualities of universal being" as being those which correspond directly to the "necessary phases of artistic apprehension" (A Portrait 211). This statement leads directly into a discussion of the three qualities of beauty and art, relying completely on Aquinas for such divisions.
    "Aquinas says: as pulcritudinem tria requiruntur, integritas, consonantia, claritas. I [Stephen Dedalus] translate it so: Three things are needed for beauty, wholeness, harmony and radiance" (A Portrait 212). Once again, Joyce misquotes Aquinas; the actual translates as: "For beauty includes three conditions: integrity or perfection, since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness, or clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have an elegant colour" (Part I; question 39; article 8). Even though Joyce does misquote Aquinas, for the most part he seems to be fairly accurate in his interpretation, though there are some significant differences. Joyce interprets integritas as wholeness: that something is apprehended as one thing (A Portrait 212). Beebe claims that "Joyce's definition is probably even closer to the Latin text than [translation]" (30). However, Noon maintains that Joyce misses a good part of what Aquinas meant, for, "it is clear that by integritas. . . he [Aquinas] has in mind the completeness or perfection which a being possesses when it is all that it ought to be" (47). It seems that another of Joyce's influences, Aristotle, also had a similar idea in mind with his concept of entelechy. Next, Stephen tells Lynch [his dialogue partner] that, "Having first felt that it is one thing you feel now that it is a thing. You apprehend it as complex, multiple, divisible, separable, made up of its parts, the result of its parts and their sum, harmonious. That is consonantia" (A Portrait 212). This account of consonantia is, for the most part, Thomistically accurate. The only difference between Joyce and Aquinas is Joyce's presentation of it as static, while Aquinas concentrates on its dynamic principles (Noon 48). While the interpretation of both integritas and consonantia remain fairly accurate to Saint Thomas, Joyce's interpretation of claritas diverges considerably from traditional meanings. Stephen, in looking at claritas, seems to feel a rather ambiguousness about it, stating: 

The connotation of the word, . . . is rather vague. Aquinas uses a term which seems to be inexact. It baffled me for a long time. It would lead you to believe that he had in mind symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but the shadow, the reality of which it is but symbol. I thought he might mean that claritas is the artistic discovery and representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force of generalisation which would make the esthetic image a universal one, 

make it outshine its proper conditions. But that is literary talk. I un derstand it so. . . .You see that it [an object] is that thing which it is and no other thing. The radiance of which he speaks is the scholastic quidditas, the whatness of a thing. (A Portrait 212-213) 

Of al1 the problems with Joyce's interpretation, both William Noon and Maurice Beebe seem to agree that Joyce was wrong in not allowing any sort of spiritual interpretation. Of Stephen's comment concerning "artistic discovery," Beebe asserts: "Precisely so; for Thomists also like the powerful word effulgence. Joyce, the apostate here loses his grip" (31). Noon also agrees with this sentiment, maintaining that "it follows that Aquinas' understanding of claritas is more compatible with a 'sacramentally' symbolic view of poetry than Stephen suspects" (49). Interestingly, Joyce's misinterpretation of cleritas does not exist to this degree in Stephen Hero, where Stephen's interpretation is much more congenial to Thomistic tradition and orthodox in its nature (Beebe 32-33). In fact, it is only in Stephen Hero that Joyce makes specific reference to epiphanies, which he defines as "a sudden spiritual manifestation" (211). Curiously, these epiphanies seem quite similar to the "artistic discovery" which Joyce is critical of in A Portrait. It has been suggested "that Joyce first formulated his theory before his final break with the Church, then altered and modified it to suit his new attitude" (Beebe 32). This theory does not seem at all unlikely, especially given that Stephen Hero was not published until after Joyce's death. Whatever the reason for Joyce's divergence from Aquinas on the issue of claritas, Joyce's aesthetic can still be viewed as whole, just simply not as wholly Thomistic. Certainly though, the connection between the qualities of beauty and the stages of apprehension is sufficiently illustrated by Joyce, with an arguable glitch when it comes to Aquinas' claritas. Even with this glitch, Joyce's aesthetic theory remains complete, and is workableÑas is demonstrated in his application of it to his later works.
    It seems that James Joyce's development of his aesthetic theory in A Portrait has a profound effect on the remainder of his literary career. A. D. Hope maintains that Joyce's aesthetic theory and the position it takes is the main key to understanding "the technical structure of Joyce's two later books Ulysses and Finnegans Wake" (109). While Hope does not attempt an analy sis of Finnegans Wake, he does do so for Ulysses. In attaching Joyce's aesthetic theory to his works, Hope pays particular attention to the structure of the book. In his analysis of Ulysses. Hope argues that in Joyce shadowing his aesthetic image with that of Homer's Odyssey, "Neither integritas nor con sonantia is broken, for in a sense the two stories are the same, Bloom is the Ulysses of Irish Dublin" (110). Indeed, even with Finnegans Wake, the circularity of the book and its themes conform to the integritas and consonantia principles of Joyce's aesthetic theoryÑonce again illustrating its completeness and workability.
    "Personally, I detest action" (U 15:4414). Although this declaration by Stephen Dedalus in Ulysses does not appear to be any sort of statement about Joyce's aesthetic theory, it very well could be. It is this lack of action which defines Joyce's "proper art" as being static. Further, Joyce's aesthetic theory professes that art and beauty are divorced from good and evil, as these are kinetic in nature and thus incompatible with a static aesthetic theory. Truth, however, is also static, and therefore is akin to art and beauty. In defining beauty, Joyce asserts that there are three necessary conditions for universal beauty: integritas, consonantia, and claritasÑall three of which, as does most of the philosophical foundation of Joyce's aesthetic, come directly from the theories of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Although the main influence on Joyce, in terms of aesthetic theory, is Aquinas, there are many others who influence him as well; such as Aristotle, Hegel, Flaubert, and Shakespeare. From these influences, Joyce borrows here and there, using what is necessary from each to reach his ultimate end. It has been shown that this was the case with the development of Joyce's philosophy; Dolf Sorenson comments that "The most striking feature of the Joycean aesthetic theory so far is that in every aspect Joyce seems to have departed from the Aquinian interpretation in a way that suited his own arguments and his own theory" (16). Even with all of the influences though, one would not find it very difficult at all to discover something very significantly Joycean about the aesthetic theory presented in A Portrait. Joyce's aesthetic theory is so significant that its effect and development can be seen in almost any of his works. Most significant is its appearance as a major theme of A Portrait. concerning which Thomas Connolly examines and asserts that: 

When the ties with family, church, and country are cut, Stephen has as his sole possession his completely developed aesthetic theory, the theory which forced him to cut the ties. And it is at the height of the novel's irony that the theory of aesthetics which drove him from the Church is derived from Aquinas. (50)




    1The following abbreviations will be used in documentation to refer to the works of James Joyce: 

CW: Critical Writings of James Joyce (Cornell, 1989) 
A Portrait: A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (Viking Critical Library ed., 1964) SH: Stephen Hero (New Directions, 1955) 
U: Ulysses (Random House, 1986)

		Aquinas, Saint Thomas. Summa Theologica. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952.
		Beebe, Maurice. "Joyce and Aquinas: The Theory of Aesthetics." Philological Ouarterly. 36.1 (1957): 20-35.
		Connolly, Thomas E. "Joyce's Aesthetic Theory." University of Kansas City Review. 23.1 (1956): 47-50.
		Gifford, Don. Joyce Annotated. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
		Hope, A. D. "The Esthetic Theory of James Joyce." Australisian Journal of    Psychologv and Philosophy. 21.2-3 (1943): 93-114.
		Joyce, James. The Critical Writings of James Joyce. Ed. Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989.
		---. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. Ed. Chester G. Anderson.  Viking Critical Library ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1968.
		---. Stephen Hero. Ed. John J. Slocum and Herbert Cahoon. New ed. New York: New Directions Books, 1955.
		---.   Ulysses. Ed. Hans Walter Gabler with Wolfhard Steppe and Claus Melchoir. Corrected Text ed. New York: Random House, 1986.
Noon, William T. Jovce and Aquinas. New Haven: Yale University Press,
     1957
Sorensen, Dolf. ~ames Jovce's Ae$thetic Theorv. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1977.