An Analysis of the Kena Upanishad

by Kena Herod

			In Hinduism, the Upanishads are called the Vedanta, the end of the VedasÑthe culmination or aim of the teachings of the Vedas. Unlike the Vedas which concentrate more on the pantheon of gods, the Upanishads are philosophical texts that ". . .contain a scientific search for the Substratum underlying the phenomenal forces of nature," and represent a shift in attention from God (Vedic period) to Self (Upanishadic period) (Ranade 2).  Nevertheless, individual Self or Atman is recognized by the Upanishads to be of the One, BrahmanÑthe Absolute or true reality.  According to the Upanishads, the problem for humanity is recognizing this connection, " Tat tvam asi," "That thou art," discarding the false notion that the body is a part of one's Self. There are over two hundred Upamshads but only thirteen are considered canonical, written in the period between ninth and fourth BCE. They are: Svetasvatara, Maitrayaniya, Kausitaki,  Chandogya, Brhadaranyaka, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Mundaka, Mandukya, Prasna, Isavasya, Kena, and Katha. This essay will  focus on the Kena Upamshad, an analysis of the text, and its parallels in Western thought. In doing so, several major points in Upanishadict thinking will be discussedÑwhat is the nature of reality, what is true knowledge, how is such knowledge obtained, and how does one achieve freedom from the bounds of the physical world?
     In the first part of the Kena Upanishad, a pupil asks: "By whom willed and directed does the mind light on its objects? By whom commanded does life, the firs, move?. . . And what god is it that prompts the eye and the ear?" (Kena I 1 Radhakrishnan). The pupil's question assumes that both the physical world and our senses that perceive it, are dependent on something other than themselves. Like Plato's metaphysics, the Upanishadic view is that there is more than one reality. The reality we experience through sensation is transitory, perishable, finite, and illusionary, however, there is another reality that is unchangeable, permanent, and infinite which governs the phenomenal world (Radhakrishnan 581). Brahman is this permanent true reality and the aagent of the individual." Yet Brahman cannot be expressed by the teacher to the pupil because "Brahman is not an object subject to mind, speech, and the senses" (Rahdakrishnan 581). In the "Seventh Letter," Plato also contends that the Absolute cannot be expressed through the senses, namely, language: ". . . this is why no reasonable man will ever venture to identify his thoughts with linguistic symbols and thus render them immutable as become all things written [or spoken] with the letters of the alphabet (qtd in tsaxis 49).
     Brahman is unteachable because, like the Western rationalistic standpoint, the senses are faulty. Descartes argues that knowledge obtained from anything through the senses, outside one's reason, is questionable. By using reason in examining a given proposition, one can determine the proposition's truth if it is self-contradictory to deny it. Nevertheless, the Kena Upanishad argues something more radical: Brahman cannot be a proposition or object for the reasoning mind. Therefore, Brahman cannot be known through logic, mind, or senses. The wise who give up both notions on, " . . . departing from this world, become immortal" (Kena I 2 Hume). Plato argues a similar notion in the Phaedo: The wise live the philosophical life, the aim of which is final death. That is to say the soul, which is the connection between physical reality and the Realm of Forms, is trapped in the body and yearns to return to that other reality (in Platonic thought all souls have been in the Realm of Forms before becoming trapped in the body). The philosopher becomes a sort of ascetic, discounting the body and satisfying only its most basic needs. Giving in to the passions which concern the physical world adds weight to the soul. Thus, when a person who has led a life of indulging the passions, a life of sensation instead of reason, dies, the soul of that person must return to the physical worldÑtransmigration. However, the philosopher, because s/he has purified the soul by giving up the life of sensation, achieves final death, an end to transmigration and permanent residence in the Realm of Forms. Additionally, Plato believed that we can only come close to achieving full knowledge of the Absolute because of the entrapment of the soul in the body in a second rate reality, where all objects in the physical world are only copies of the real thing in the Realm of Forms.
     A somewhat similar idea is expressed in the Kena Upanishad. Accordingly, the aim of life for the wise, maintain the Upanishadic thinkers, is to achieve a sort of final death, moksha (release, liberation) from samasara (the wheel, reincarnation). The wise must ignore maya (illusion) in much the same way the Platonic thinker disregards the demands and whims of the passions linked to the physical world. Furthermore, the wise must concentrate by both thought and meditation on Brahman, the Absolute. As with the Realm of Forms in Platonic thought, there is great difficulty in penetrating the inscrutable Brahman (it must be kept in mind that though both are the Absolutes in their respective systerns they are not alike; in Plato's Realm of Forms there are distinct forms whereas Brahman is the One). Nevertheless, the Kena Upanishad still insists that Brahman is knowable because although it is other than the known, it is also "above the unknowable" (Kena I 3 Hume). Finally, Brahman because it cannot be an object should not be worshiped as such; it should, instead, be understood through Atman.
     Part II of the Kena Upanishad explores the paradox of Brahman, knowing what seems unknowable. The teacher says to the pupil, "If you think you have understood Brahman well, you know it but slightly whether it refers to you (the individual self) or to the gods" (Kena II 1 Radhakrishnan). Furthermore, the teacher demands of the pupil that he must seek Brahman on his own since, as established in Part I, Brahman cannot be taught even though it can be known. "I do not think I know it well; nor do I think that I do not know it. He who among us knows it, knows it and he, too, does not that he does not know" (Kena II 2 Radhakrishnan). Here again is the problem of expressing how one can know Brahman. Only individually can one come to know Brahman and that knowledge defies logic and, necessarily, communication. The first sentence, "I do not think that I know it well; nor do I think that I do not know it" refers to the idea that Brahman cannot be the object of ordinary logical reasoning, but "those who delight in true knowledge go into a greater darkness or mystery" know Brahman if not "well " (Carmody 22 ). Radhakrishnan comments that this is another kind of knowledge, intuitive realization and experience, samyag-alarsanam, which is distinct from the kind of knowledge we gain through philosophical processes (584-585).
     Part II section 3 deals further with samyag-alarsanam but also with the idea that the wise are aware of their limitations in the understanding of Brahman since after all it is a mystery. "It is conceived of by him by whom It is not conceived of; He by whom It is conceived of, knows it not. It is not understood by those who [say they] understand It. It is understood by those who [say they] understand It not" (Hume 337). Socrates expresses a similar idea in the Apology. After hearing that the orade at Delphi declared him to be the wisest of men, he set out to find a man wiser than himself. Socrates concludes: "I am wiser than this [reputedly wise] man; it is likely that neither of us knows any thing worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser to this small extent that I do not think I know what I do not know" (Plato 21b 44). Furthermore, both passages and their places within their respective systems of thought indicate that while one is still trapped in the body within a physical world that is illusionary, the wise believe that they can never be sure that when they have obtained full knowledge of anything much less the Absolute. That is why the Upanishadic thinker (and the Platonic thinker) yearn for final death of the body. Only then, they hope, that by leading the ascetic life, concentrating and meditating on the Brahman through Atman thus filtering out the distractions of maya, will release from 
samsara and union with Brahrnan will occur. "Through one's self [Atman] one gains power and through wisdom one gains immor tality" (Kena II 4).
     In Part III and the beginning of Part IV, the tone of the Kena Upanishad changes from purely philosophical speculation to an allegory of the gods. In Part III section 1, we are told that the gods in their victory over the demons have become conceited even though it was Brahman who really made their victory possible. In section 2, Brahman appears before them but they do not know what the spirit is. In sections 3-24, three gods are asked by the others to find out what the spirit is. First, Agni tries. He approaches the spirit and the spirit, Brahman, asks who he is and what powers does he possess. Agni replies that he is Jata-vedas (omniscient) and he can burn anything on earth. Brahman places a blade of grass before him and commands, "Burn this." Agni tries but fails and is unable to guess what the spirit is. Next, the gods ask Vayu, the air, to find out what the spirit is. Vayu approaches the spirit and again Brahman asks the god who he is and what power does he possess. Vayu declares that he can blow anything off the earth. The spirit places the blade of grass in front of the god and commands him to blow it away. Once again the god is powerless to do so, and fails to find out who or what the spirit is. Finally, the gods ask Indra to solve the mystery, however, when he approaches the spirit it disappears instantly. Suddenly, "in the same region of sky," beautiful Uma appears. Indra asks her to tell him the identity of the wondrous spirit. In the beginning of Part IV she reveals the nature of the spirit as being that of Brahman. Radhakrishan comments that Uma is the Wisdom that dispels Indra's ignorance. Wisdom is beautiful like Uma because it "is the expression of inward purity. Sins leave a scar on the soul 
that disfigures it" (589). The teaching of the allegory is that Brahman is the cause of the god's greatness. The gods, even powerful ones like Indra, Vayu, and Agni, are nothing in comparison to the Supreme Brahman. However, because of close contact with the Absolute and through the grace of Uma in Indra's case (he is the most powerful of the three because he knew of Brahman first), they obtain the knowledge of Brahman thus making them more powerful than the others. Therefore, those who obtain knowledge of Brahman are better off than those who do not. "Of It there is this teaching.ÑThat in the lightning which flashes forth, which makes one blink, and say 'Ah!'Ñthat 'Ah!' refers to divinity. Now with regard to oneself.ÑThat which comes, as it were, to the mind, by which one repeatedly remembersÑthat conception (samkalpa) [is it]!" (Kena IV 4-5 Hume). Like the quick appearance and disappearance of Brahman before the gods and the knowledge of its nature gained by the three gods, so is enlightenment for the mortal. Radhakrishnan maintains that the illustration of lightning indicates "the instantaneous enlightenment produced by the union of the individual soul with the transcendental principle of the universal wisdom. . . . There is a sudden enlarging of the mind. . ." (591). Thus the power and enlightenment gained from knowing Brahman is paradoxically the "object of all desire . . . dearest of all" (Kena IV 6 Radhakrishnan). The pupil further implores the teacher to reveal the secret of the Upanishad, and the teacher replies that the secret relating to Brahman has already been taught (Kena IV 7). To obtain this knowledge, the teacher explains that austerities, restraint, self-control (leading the life of an ascetic) must be practiced and the Vedas be absorbed. In doing so, the pupil will find truth (Kena IV 8) and become "established in the most excellent, endless, heavenly worldÑyea, he becomes established!" (Kena IV 9 Hume).
     As short as the Kena Upanishad is, it covers much ground: meuphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and how one should live (asceticism). Nevertheless, it is incomplete in much the same way Platonic thought is. Both philosophies purport to have the key (obtaining true knowledge) to permanent release from the physical world and transmigration but they cannot explain what it is, only what it is not. Furthermore, if the physical world which includes our bodies is so illusionary (maya) how could one ever know for certain that s/he has acquired true knowledge; how can one be assured that one has not fallen into self-deception? What is even the point of trying to acquire true knowledge of the Absolute if even the wise are cautious about how well they know it, and that possibly full knowledge of the Absolute is only obtainable after the death of the body.?
     In spite of these problems there is at least one important lesson in this Upanishad in Part II section 3. Although the writer of this text may not have intended it, "It is not understood by those who [say they] understand It. It is understood by those who [say they] understand it not" can be applied to other areas of human concern besides God. Many times when we believe ourselves to know all there is to know about a particular subject, whether in ethics or politics for example, we make ourselves more vulnerable to mistakes, sometimes disastrous ones. To claim to know all there is to know about something stunts and limits us. People who are able to admit that they do not understand all there is about something are more likely to make fewer mistakes. Awareness of ignorance both allows us the opportunity for reflection on a particular issue and increases our curiosity for more knowledge about it; thus allowing us to make better decisions. This kind of humility can help all of humanity grow and prosper.

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