Scepticism

by Jeanne Leonard

      Philosophically speaking, seepticism is a belief that there is no certain knowledge. When presented with any new piece of knowledge no matter how true it seems to beÑa seeptie will sink into doubt, arguing that we can never be certain of even "certain knowledge."
       Scepticism was first introduced by Pyrrho (300B.C.), a Greek philosopher whose writings did not become significant until they were re-discovered and published in the 16th century. it was during this period that the Protestant Reformation began in Europe. The Roman Catholic Church was challenged. Martin Luther and his followers wanted to pray directly to God, and read and interpret the Bible on their ownÑnot through the authority of the Catholic Pope. Protestantism formed a distinct religious structure.
       A "moral crisis" coincided with the Reformation. Europeans began travelling, and encountered other cultures. The confrontation with foreign cultures threw Europe into doubt about their own culture: Obviously, their own way wasn't the only way to live. They could no longer assume theirs was the right way. In addition, science was providing an intellectual crisis that would lead to further moral and religious doubts. The astronomer Copernicus discovered that the long-held theory of geocentricity was wrong. He argued that the sun was the center of our solar system, and Galileo published his findings.
       Such revolutions in religion, morality and science sent all of Europe into a state of doubt. Everything the people had believed to be certain, was in fact wrong. People questioned everything, and realized through experience that "certainty" isn't always certain. They realized that nothing could be known for certain.
       It is small wonder, then, that Pyrrho's writings on scepticism became popular. He spoke to people's experience. The world was turned upside down. There was no where to turn for absolute knowledgeÑthe church, the society, even science were suspect. Nothing was certain, and it seemed there was no method to provide even a basis of certainty on which to build. Rene Descartes was troubled by the implications of scepticism. He could not live with uncertainty, and set out to find a foundation for certain knowledge. Descartes' first task involved abandoning all previous beliefs. He did not want any preconceived notions to confuse judgment. He also did not want to assert anything as absolute until proven so
.       Descartes was a Rationalist. He believed in innate knowledge; that it was not to be found ourside the self. So, he denied everything outside himself and looked within. Descartes first questioned the reliability of information gathered by his own senses, and then his ability to distinguish wakefulness from sleep. He could not be sure that he was awake. One could never know if one was dreaming. Descartes then attacked reason itself 1 + 1 = 2 whether I am sleeping or dreaming, he thinks. But perhaps he reached reasonable condclusions only because an evil demon gave him information to trick him. Descartes finally realized that while wondering if he was deceived by an evil demon, and when he doubted whether he was awake or not, he was at least thinking. To be in doubt is to think. And to be aware of your own awareness is to be aware of yourself. Descartes concluded that when he thinks of himself as a thinking being, then he must exist: "Cogito ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am). This proof is limited to that time during which the subject thinks it. One cannot be certain s/he exists all of the time, existence is only certain when s/he is aware of her/himself as thinking.
       Descartes continued, with elaborate proofs, to affirm the existence of God and that because of God, he could know anything at all about the world. He still wanted to gather certain knowledge, so Descartes established the "theory" of the truth of every clear, distinct thought and idea. This theory is justified with the assertion that a benevolent God created Descartes as a thinking entity. God would not trick him into believing something untrue, therefore, all distinct and clear ideas come from God and are, necessarily, true. Every assertion Descartes made after the cogito; everything he set forth as "certain knowledge" stemmed from his own clear and distinct ideas.       	
			Spinoza, in contrast, seemed unplagued by doubt. He was apparently certain of his claim of substance and causation. Being "self-caused" means ". . .that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can be conceived only as existing." The only "thing" self-caused is God/the world (God and the world are one and the same). Everything else humans, animals, plants,etc are modifications of this self-caused substance (God/the world). Spinoza claimed that we could not conceive of ourselves without conceiving of the world. Yet we can conceive of the world without ourselves. This is how Spinoza explained all as the modification (". . .the affections of substance; that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else") of God or substance. So we are God; people are "exlensions" of God as an arm is an extension of the body. When the mind thinks to move it, the arm moves
.       Spinoza is considered a monist because, as his philosophy illustrates, everything is oneÑGod. Flawed thinking causes people to believe in the existence of many separate substances. We attribute pluraliy to the world, says Spinoza, because we are 
imperfect and perceive it mistakenly. Two things we separate out are extended ideas and things. Ideas and objects seem to run parallel to one anotherÑnever interfering. An idea cannot "bump into" an extended object, nor vice versa. Neither can one ever limit the other, yet they are both modifications of God, for Spinoza. These are one, and, likewise, they are both one in that sense. Spinoza argues that the mind is the expression of the intellect of God. If, then, we considcr that everything is one we are all God (modifications of substance), and our ideas are God's as well. Ideas and extended things are simply parts of the whole, and that whole is God. Spinoza's claim concerning the mind in this context seems plausible
.       We should not seek knowledge, Spinoza continues. If everything is one, then no knowledge about other things exists. We can only hope to discover the logical principles: everything is a logical consequence (caused by) God. There is no need to investigate apparently new things; we need only to recognize how all things are connected as one. Furthermore, investigations based on sensory experience is detrimental to finding certainy. Spinoza calls all sensory knowkdge that of "opinion or imagination"Ñthe lowest form of knowledge which leads to confusion and error. Mathematics and reasoning are higher forms of knowledge. Although reason is not a perfect tool, it moves us closer to obtaining certain knowledge. Intuitive knowledge, the highest form, leads to absolute certainty. Once we intuitively grasp the concept of God and all as a single whole, we have obtained certain knowledge. Obtaining this ~truth" is Spinoza's goalÑit is his certain knowledge.
       Unlike Spinoza, Leibniz believes in pluraliy. There are billions of "monads" all over the earth. A "monad" is a consciousness that is aware of the world. Because the monads are isolated from the world (windowless), however, they remain unaffected by everything outside themselves. This causes a scepticism of other minds because they are unknowable: monads are in a state of solipsism (meaning they are "irrevocably alone". Liebniz does not insist on total scepticism, however he allows that monads can, independently, have a change of consciousness thry can grow towards greater clarity and understanding of ideas. This idea of the floating consciousness, able to achieve deeper insights is Leibniz's response to scepticism.
       Leibniz, Spinoza and Descartes all approach scepticism from a rationalist stance. They believe in the internal origin of knowledge; it is a priori. Rationalism yields absolute certainty because it works with concepts as if they are mathematical equations (All A are B; All B are C, therefore all A are C). Rationalism uses deductive reasoning to move from an initial principle to the explication of a basic definition.       Although the rationalists' deductive approach give means to collecting information with certainty, they do not lead to any new knowledge about the world. John Locke and other empiricists wanted to find ccrtain knowledge about the world. Locke believes knowledge is gained through experience. When one goes out into the world, the mind is a "blank slate" until the world is perceived. Having perceived the world using the senses, the mind performs "operations" on the information. (The mind distinguishes between a cloudy and partly cloudy day, it determines whether the air is hot or warm or cold.) This Locke calls knowledge: the mind's comparing and contrasting of ideas and its ability to discern similarities and differences. The mind cannot, however, have these ideas on its own. It must gather ideas through the perception of objects in the world.
	       Locke continues, we cannot know actual objects at all, only their apparent qualities. I, then, only know air through its temperature; I know the sky only through its colors. I cannot know the substance; not the air itself, nor the sky itself, nor the clouds. I can only know their qualities, and these qualities that create my ideas.  Locke goes on to argue that substance is"I know not what."  So Locke leaves the individual with some amount of uncertainty.  The thing itself can never be known, so ideas can never be compared with their objects to verify accuracy.
			The level of uncertainity in which Locke leaves philosophy troubles and inspires George Berkeley. the perpetrator seems to be Locke's "I know not what (substance is)".  In response to scepticism, Berkeley takes the same empiricist apporach found in Locke. Although he believes that knowledge is gained through the sense and as a result of experience, he rejects that the ideas one has of objects come from their secondary qualities. The objects, Berkeley states, are actually sets of qualities and these qualities are only real when we perceive them.  Furthermore, there is no substance to sustain these secondary qualities. Why is substance necessary?  When were estended, "sustained" objects without secondary qualities ever experienced?  It is impossible, says Berkeley.  There is no mysterious, unknowable, lurking substance underneath everything.  If so, there is certain knowledge: what is seen/perceived (and the ideas generated therein) is what we know.
	If there is no substance, however, Berkeley argues that for soemthing "to be" it must "be perceived."  It cannot exist otherwise for secondary qualities are the only reality and these do not exist unless perceived.  This may somehow lead to deeper uncertainty. the world appears too orderly to support such a theory--if things were constantly popping in and out of existence, ther ewould be mass chaos. Berkeley feels he needs to account for orderliness, but hte concept of substance leads to doubt.  If substance is "I know not what," knowledge is still limited, so he asserts that God is the ultimate perceiver of things. Things can exist when we are not perceiving them.  this is what gives the world its order--omnipresent, omnipotent perception.
	David Hume, an empiricist who attempted toe stablish what is known and how it is known, explored what can be known about the future.  He, too, searches for absolute knowledge, and argues that, with it, the future shoudl be predictable. If we cannot do so with current knowlege, then it remains unceratin.  KNowledge is gained through experience-our perceptions, states Hume. That which is perceive dis perceived in its rawest form. The world reaches our senses in little bits as it is in reality, but our mind automatically performs operations on these "bits."  The information is then clumpted with other bits and forms ideas. With these ideas, one is able to perform still more complex operations throug hassoication. This is done in three ways: resemblance is determiend (the book resembes its movie); contiguous ideas are recognized (an aparatemtn is understood inr elation to neighboring aparatments in the complex); and cause and effect relationships are recognized (on thing/idea/event seems to give rise toa nother). Hume is most attentive to this last realtionship.
	Hume explains his concept of "matter of ideas."  Mathematics, for example, are matters of ideas. These ideas are useless, however.  If an experienced mind had a gun in its possession, it would not recognize shooting bullets, noisy gunfire or  kiling simply by studying the gun. This mind, using only matters of ideas, would not know that the gun caused any of these other things, says Hume. The experienced mind, however, would indeed connect the gun with loud noises, etc. And this mind would assert that gunfire is necessarily connected with the gun.  yet, Hume says this is too strong an assertion. Simply becuase every time one has seen a gun fired, one has heard loud noise, it cannot beguaranteed that htenoise will happen every time.  It is habitual for us to assume cause and effect relationships liek this, says Hume. This is done to make life easier.  One mistakenly labels "cause" or "necessary connection" where a causal relationship cannot be proven. (Indeed, the silencer gun illustrates that a judgment of "necessary connection is wrong.)
       When one observes the world, and habitually makes causal connections, one is noticing a "constant conjunction" of events. Information gathered through experienceÑparticular incidentsÑand generalizations are made from the particular to the absolute. One uses, imperfect, inductive reasoning which can simply estimate probabilities, never predict certainties because it leaps from the particular to the general. All one has then, claims Hume, are "constant conjunctions"Ñhigh probabilities which yeild certainty only about past events, not future predictions. Knowledge of true necessary connections is unattainable, but what is available is reliable enough for daily living
.       Although he circled back to scepticism, Hume had ideas which intrigued Immanuel Kant. Kant asserted that Hume had it all a"upside down", however. To find out about the world, it is necessary to experience it. Kant makes the connection between rationalism and empiricism, and contends that thc two are interdependent. He supports this claim of interdependency (a concepts without percepts are blind; percepts without concepts are empty") by proving "All knowledge begins with experience, but all knowledge does not arise from experience."
       As Hume said, the perceptions one has of the world are made sense of through the operations of the mind or concepts. But, before the mind can make sense of erceptions, it must have a context in which to do thisÑsome sort of a priori, intuitive knowledge. The mind is not a blank slate, as Locke says, it comes equipped with an "outline" ready catalogue the perceptions. This a priori knowledge Kant says every mind comes equipped with, is an intuition of space and time. Similar to Spinoza's claim that one cannot imagine herself without imagining the the wodd, Kant argues that the world cannot be experienced outside of the context of space. Without a concept of space, nothing could be perceived. Similarly, the internal world of concepts exists within the intuition of time. Without time and space to form our experience, states Kant, our senses would be in utter confusion. Thus, Kant links rationalism and empiricism.       This philosophical breakthtough does not, unfortunately, and the question: what and how can one know about the world? Although humans perceive and conceive within the realms of space and time, how can it be determined whether all are perceiving the same things? How can an objective reality be determined?
       Kant responds that the mind also came equipped with categories and concepts that become the lens through which one views the world. He says humans come into the wodd with these categories and view all experience as fitting somewhere into these categories. One thinks in terms of an object as it relates to another (size, etc) in quantitative ways; one judges the quality of things (good, bad, etc); one judges he modality of things (mathematical truths); and one judges the causal relation of things. These categories are inherent, says Kant, and they assure individuals that experiences of the world are aobjectivdy valid empirical cognitions."
       Under the category of arelation," it is the causal relationship that Hume zeros in on and wants to use as a foundation for a "science of nature." Kant gives much credence to his own categories of thc mind in claiming that they provide us with objectivity valid judgments about the world. It is through these categories, he says, that we determine what cause is: our categories (laws of understanding) give birth to universal laws. So we only know the world and cause through the way they appear to us through our categories. All we can know is the way that the wodd appears to us, says Kant. We can only know "phenornena." As for "noumena" (things in themsdves)Ñwe can never know them.
       So absolute certain knowledge of the world, for Kant, is impossible. But we can at least be sure that we know that experience must have concepts to accompany it and vice versa. Also on Kant's view, ve can know that our perceptions are objcctively valid.       
		It's hard to say which philosopher was the most successful in undermining skepticism. Locke seems to fail at it because of his theoryÑsubstance can't be known. But he asks us to believe in it on some kind of blind faith.
       Hume gives us decent practical knowledge with his notion of constant conjunctions. But these are not certain and he tells us we can never obtain any certainity.
       It seems that Leibniz and Berkeley, to avoid uncertainty, present impenetrable, unobservable theories that hinge on their own bizarre and unprovable ideas: Berkdey's "to be is to be perceived" we simply have to believe in if we want certainy. The only "proof" he offers that this could be true, is to resort to a God being the ultimate perceiver. But God can't be proven as certain and so neither can Berkeley's theory. Leibniz's theory, again, is so "far out" and depends on our believing in the existence of monads.
	       Like Berkeley and Leibniz, Spinoza's theories depend on believing his proclaimed "truths." Yet Spinoza does offer an attractive epistemology. When Kant says that the laws of nature stem from the laws of our understanding, and what we know is the way the world appears to us, I can't help but think that maybe Spinoza was rightÑour thinking could be faulty. Maybe noumena are knowable. Maybe phenomena are the problem. If we could rid ourselves of the way that we (as part of the human condition) attribute things to the world (that may not even be there), then we could see the world truly as it is. Maybe phenomena,(as we attribute things to the world) stand in our way of knowing noumena. This is compelling to me. Yet Spinow doesn't offer any real, provable certainties: he only offers his own self-proclaimed ~truthsn tbat can be believed or not believed, but never proven.
       While both Kant and Descartes base their epistemologies on unprovable theories, they at least make significant contributions to adding to certain knowledge. Kant's categories of the mind can never be proven as true, and his epistemology seems to rely on these categories. Descartes, too, requires us to bdieve in a God before we can know anything clearly and distinctly.
       Yet both Kant and Descartes do make breakthroughs in certain knowledge. Kant's contribution of the interdependency of rationalism and empiricism as proven by the nodons of space and time, seems indubiubly certain. Descartes, too, gives us certainty with the cogito. So overlooking Kant's admittance that we can't know noumena, and his sdf-created "categories," he does enhance what we have for certain knowledge. With Descartes it's the same type of case.
       I guess I think none of the philosophers do such a great job in undermining sceptical doubt, but I do think that Descartes makes the best contribution to finding certain knowledge.
       If I begin from the beginningÑthe Copernican Revolution; Protestant ReformationÑit seems that such crises where people feel as though they can't rely on the ground underneath them as being certainÑit would be significant to be able to claim for certain that you do at least exist. This gives humans some of our power back. If we can't even be certain of ourselves, it seems pointless to try and be certain of the world around us.